Land & Water Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 7

1971

Application of Wyoming Statutes: Section 34-60 (1957) - The
Possibility of Implied Tenancies Other than Tenancies by
Sufferance in Wyoming
David Berry

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Berry, David (1971) "Application of Wyoming Statutes: Section 34-60 (1957) - The Possibility of Implied
Tenancies Other than Tenancies by Sufferance in Wyoming," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , pp.
553 - 567.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Berry: Application of Wyoming Statutes: Section 34-60 (1957) - The Possi

APPLICATION OF WYOMING STATUTES: SECTION
34-60 (1957)--THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLIED
TENANCIES OTHER THAN TENANCIES BY
SUFFERANCE IN WYOMING
We shall ultimately be concerned with attempting to decipher the meaning and propriety of Wyoming Statutes, Section 34-60, 34-61 (1957)1 as ascertained from a review of their
judicial interpretation and as ascertained from a study of the
statutes themselves. These statutes deal with holdover tenants
and tenants by sufferance; however, before we can consider
these statutes and related Wyoming cases specifically, we must
consider the concepts of tenancy by sufferance, of tenancy at
will, of tenancy from period to period, and of holdover tenancy
as they are applied today.
TENANCY

By

SUFFERA-NCE

Tenancy by sufferance is most frequently discussed in
connection with the holdover tenant. A holdover tenant is one
who has entered upon land with the permission of the owner
or rightful possessor but has subsequently remained on the
land after his right to possession has expired. Absent some
affirmative action on the part of the rightful possessor, the
holdover tenant is a tenant by sufferance who continues in
Copyright @ 1971 by the University of Wyoming
1. WYO. STAT. § 34-60 (1957).
In this state there shall not exist the relations of landlord and tenant,
by implication or operation of law, except a tenancy by sufferance.
Upon expiration of a term created by lease, either verbal or written,
there shall be no implied renewal of the same, for any period of time
whatever, either by the tenant holding over or by the landlord accepting compensation or rent for or during any period of such holding over.
Such holding over by the tenant and acceptance of rent by the landlord
shall constitute only a tenancy by sufferance, with the rights, duties,
obligations and incidents of such tenancy.
Except for minor changes grammatically, WYO. STAT. § 34-60 is the same
as each of these preceding statutes:
Wyo. C.L. ch. 72 § 2 (1876), Wyo. R.S. § 1887 (1887); Wyo. R.S.
§ 2772 -(1899), WYo. C.S. § 3664 (1910), Wyo. C.S. § 4621 (1920),
Wyo. R.S. § 97-207 (1931), Wyo. C.S. § 61-219 (1945).
WYO. STAT. § 34-61 (1957).
No lease which shall have expired by its own limitation shall be again
renewed except by express contract in writing, signed by the parties
thereto, whether the original lease be written or verbal. Nor shall any
other tenancy than that by sufferance exist after the termination of
the original lease, unless created as aforesaid, by express contract in
writing.
Except for minor grammatical changes, Wyo. STAT. § 34-61 (1957) is the
same as each of these preceding statutes:
WYO. C.L. ch. 72 § 2 (1976), Wyo. R.S. § 1387 (1887), Wyo. R.S.
§ 2773 (1899), WYO. C.S. § 3665 (1910), Wyo. C.S. 4622 (1920), WYo.
R.S. § 97-208 (1931), WYo. C.S. § 61-220 (1945).
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possession only due to the forbearance or laches of such rightful possessor.' Such a tenant has no title' and stands in no
privity with the rightful possesor' A tenant by sufferance
merely has naked possession of the land.'
Tenancy by sufferance might also arise when a tenant
at will tries to transfer or assign his interest; such an attempt
terminates the interest. In this particular situation the tenant
at will might become a tenant by sufferance; the transferee,
however, is definitely a trespasser, not a tenant by sufferance,
since he has entered without right.' A tenant at will whose
landlord dies also becomes a tenant by sufferance with respect
to his landlord's successor.'
The landlord or rightful possessor has three options when
dealing with a holdover tenant. First, through continued forbearance he may extend the holdover tenant's status as a
tenant by sufferance.' Second, the landlord may take affirmative action and may treat the overholding tenant as a tenant
for a year.9 Third, again by affirmative action, the landlord
may treat such a tenant as a trespasser.1" Should the landlord
elect the course of forbearance, the tenant by sufferance is a
bare licensee toward whom only a duty of protection from willful and wanton injury is due." The tenant by sufferance is
entitled to no notice to quit, and he need give none. 2 A tenant
by sufferance is not liable for rent ;3 however, he is responsible for the reasonable value of his occupation and use. 4 When
a tenant by sufferance is forced to vacate the land, he must
leave immediately, but he can take his possessions with him.
Should a tenant by sufferance fail to take his possessions with
him when he vacates, the vacation may be considered incomplete, and the landlord may enter and remove the holdover's
personal property from the premises provided that the land2.
8.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. 189, 88 N.E. 843, 844 (1909).
Margosian v. Markarian, 288 Mass. 1,97, 192 N.E. 612, 613 (1934).
Benton v. Williams, supra note 2, at 844.
Margosian v. Markarian, eupra note 3.
McLeran v. Benton, 73 Cal. 329, 14 P. 879 (1887).
Sabinski v. Patterson, 100 Ind. App. 657, 196 N.E. 539 (1935).
Benton v. Williams, supra note 4.
Kokalis v. Whitehurst, 334 Mich. 477, 54 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1952).
Id.
Margosian v. Markarian, supra note 3, at 613.
Benton v. Williams, supra note 2, at 844.
Hampton v. Mott Motors, 32 A.2d 247, 248 (Mun. App. 1943).
Lawer v. Mitts, 33 Wyo. 249, 238 P. 654 (1925).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/7

2

Berry: Application of Wyoming Statutes: Section 34-60 (1957) - The Possi

1971

COMMENTS

lord doesn't convert it to his own use 5 and provided that he
uses no unreasonable force. A tenant by sufferance is, however, entitled to re-enter and recover any crops grown by him
prior to notice to vacate.'
If the landlord elects to treat the holdover tenant as a
tenant from period to period, the duration of the period will be
fixed by reference to the rent reservation arrangement found
in the previously expired lease. The amount of rent due will
be fixed in like manner. A more detailed discussion of the
rights and responsibilities due to and from a tenant from
period to period will be presented later in this work.
If the landlord elects the third course of action and treats
the holdover tenant as a trespasser, an interesting situation
arises; a tenant by sufferance becomes a trespasser. Since a
tenant by sufferance differs from a trespasser or disseisor
only in that the tenant by sufferance first entered the land
by color of right, 7 the step between the two is logical, once the
right is terminated by an act of the landlord, the distinction
between trespasser and tenant by sufferance ceases to exist.
However, a more complete analysis and comparison of the
remedies against a trespasser and against tenant by sufferance
is necessary to fully discover the consequences of this course
of action.
As noted above, the main difference between a tenant by
sufferance and a trespasser is the presence of initial right of
entry in the former. Though these concepts are quite similar,
it is apparently to the landlord's advantage to convert the
tenant by suferance into a trespasser by affirmative action,
i.e., ejectment or summary proceedings or an attempted entry
by the landlord.' The advantage arises from an increase in
available remedies. Against a tenant by sufferance, the landlord has but one real remedy, an action for use and occupation.'" Such action in assumpsit is founded upon the fiction
that a tenant by sufferance holds "of" the landlord; actually
he holds "against" the landlord.2" A suit for use and occupa15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Finnigan v. Hadley, 286 Mass. 345, 190
Fleming v. Groggins, 375 P.2d 474, 476
Benton v. Williams, supra note 2.
Mitchell v. Hyman, 43 R.I. 267, 111 A.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 174, at 280
Id. at 279.

N.E. 528 (1934).
(Wyo. 1962).
369, 370 (1920).
(3d ed. 1939).
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tion allows the landlord to recover the reasonable value of the
holdover's stay. 1 A landlord may recover possession by an action of ejectment against the tenant by sufferance," but at
common law a prerequisite to such a suit is actual entry upon
the land by the landlord.23 Such an affirmative action actually
transforms the tenant by sufferance into a trespasser so the
remedy of ejectment does not exist against a tenant by sufferance. Summary proceedings, which require no entry on the
part of the landlord, may be viewed as a remedy against the
tenant by sufferance, but the act of commencing such proceedings is probably enough of an affirmative act to make the holdover become a trespasser.
The most advantageous remedies available to the landlord,
who treats the holdover as a trespasser, are mesne profits '
and consequential damages.2" These damage measures taken
together quite conceivably involve a greater monetary recovery
than merely suing for use and occupation. Mesne profits involves loss of intervening profits for the length of the trespass whereas use and occupation involves only the reasonable
value of the use during the holdover period. Also available
as a remedy against a trespasser is action for forcible entry
and detainer. 6 Of course the holdover tenant entered with
right, but once he is treated as a trespasser this distinction
would be lost and a forcible entry suit could follow.
From the preceding it is apparent that it can be to the
landlord's advantage in many cases to treat the holdover as a
trespasser rather than as a tenant by Sufferance. The same
may also be true regarding the options of tenancy at will
versus trespasser; this advantage will be discussed later.
TENANCY AT

WIL

Closely allied with and often confused with tenancy by
sufferance is the concept of tenancy at will. A tenancy atwill
is easily distinguished from a tenancy by sufferance; the lat21. Lawer v. Mitts, supra note 14.
22. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 288.
23. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 278.
24. Sargent v. Smith, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 426 (1859).
25. See Note, Tenancy At Sufferance In Massachusetts, 44 BOST. L. R. 213 at
225 (1964).
26. Sargent v. Smith, supra note 24.
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ter usually arises when a tenant holds over without the consent of the rightful possessor while the former arises when a
tenant enters with right and holds over with consent of the
rightful possessor and absent a notice to terminate. 7 The confusion results when judicial opinions and statutory statements
use the terms interchangeably. Historically, a tenancy at will
is created when a lease is expressly or impliedly created having an indefinite length and being conditioned upon the will
of either or both parties.2 8 Express tenancies at will are
created by express leases, either verbal or written, for an indeterminable period of time,2" but they generally provide for
rent reservation on a regular basis.8 " One should take care not
to confuse such rent reservation with the term of a periodic
tenancy which will be discussed later.
Tenancies at will may also be created by operation of law.
Such would be the case if one gained possession of real property under an oral lease made unenforceable by the Statute of
Frauds,"' or if one gained or retained possession of real property while negotiating a lease and while under no actual lease
agreement, 2 or if one gained possession of property under a
contract of sale rendered unenforceable because of the Statute
of Frauds.3
A tenancy at will is implied when one enters
on land with permission but without reservation of rent or
designation of term.8 4
Perhaps the closest similarity between a tenancy at will
and a tenancy by sufferance is evident in requirements for
notice to terminate. At common law, neither a tenant at will
nor a tenant by sufferance was entitled to notice to quit." Ten27.
28.
29.
30.

Berry v. Opel, 194 Okla. 670, 154 P.2d 575 (1945).
BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, at 126 (3d ed. 1965).
Spiritwood Grain Co. v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 179 F.2d 338 (1950).
Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, 140 A.2d 165, 168, 171 (Md. 1958).
Reservation of rent on a yearly basis, or on a fraction of a year basis,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

may create a tenancy from year to year, but at common law some
courts viewed a tenancy from year to year as a special form of tenancy
at will.
Davis v. Lovick, 226 N.C. 252, 37 S.E.2d 680 (1946).
Lyon v. Cunningham, 136 Mass. 532 (1884).
Harris v. Frink, 49 N.Y. 24 (1872).
Maffetone v. Micari, 205 Misc. 459, 127 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1954).
Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, 99 N.J. Eq. 271, 132 A. 487, 489 (1926).
'A tenancy at will is stated by Littleton to exist 'where lands or tenements are let by one man to another, to have and to hold at the will
of the lessor by force of which lease the tenant is in possession. ..
'
at common law, a tenancy at will was immediately terminated on notice
by either the landlord or the tenant.' TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT

§ 13 (1912).
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ancies at will may be terminated by operation of law 6 and by
attempt to assign or sublease,3 7 and in neither instance is notice to terminate required.3 8
When a tenant at will fails to vacate following termination of his tenancy, he becomes a holdover tenant by definition
since he has entered the land under color of right and has remained on the land following the expiration of that right.
As a holdover the tenant is subject to the same rights and options as previously discussed. The advantages of each of the
landlord's options have also been discussed.
TENANCY FROM PERIOD

To

PERIOD

The most obvious way that tenancy from period to period
differs from either a tenancy at will or a tenancy by sufferance is in the requirement of notice to terminate a periodic
tenancy. At common law the notice requirement makes it
necessary for either party, the landlord or the tenant,3 9 to give
notice of at least one full term before the lease is terminated
provided the lease term was for less than one year, if the lease
term is one year or longer, notice of six months prior to the
expiration of a term is required.4" Any attempt to terminate
the periodic tenancy without proper notice results in the
continuation of the tenancy for another period.4 1
In addition to notice requirements, periodic tenancies
differ from other tenancies in their duration. While neither
a tenancy at will nor a tenancy by sufferance has an established duration, a tenancy from period to period exists
only for the length of the set period; a tenancy from period to
period is renewed automatically for successive periods of equal
length until notice requirements are fulfilled.4 2
Periodic tenancies can be created by express agreements"
stating the terms; however, such agreements should not be
36. Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536, 38 A. 540 (1897).
37. McLeran v. Benton, supra note 6.
38. Seavey v. Cloudman, supra note 36.
McLeran v. Benton, supra note 6.
39. University of Southern California v. Weiss, 208 Cal. App.2d 759, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 475 (1962).
40. Maniatty v. Carroll Co., 114 Vt. 168, 41 A.2d 144 (1945).
41. Flower v. Darby, 1 Teron Rep. 159, 99 Eng. Rep. 1029 (K.B. 1786), as
cited in 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 337 (1963).
42. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 264.
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regarded as a series of separate tenancy agreements but
rather as a single agreement for tenancy for a self-perpetuating progression of terms which continues until proper notice
is given. Periodic tenancies may also be implied, absent
statutory material to the contrary. In many jurisdictions a
periodic tenancy will be implied in the case of a holdover tenant if the landlord so elects. 4
The preceding background will be essential to our discussion of Sections 34-60 and 34-61. According to the construction applied to these statutes, many of these tenancy
situations may or may not be presently operative in Wyoming.
Section 34-60 presents a difficult problem of interpretation. The first sentence purports to rule out the possibility
of any tenancies by implication or operation of law, other than
tenancies by sufferance. This creates an anomolous situation.
The anomoly arises with the second sentence of Section 34-60,
continues throughout the rest of the statute, and actually
carries into Section 34-61.
The situation is this. While the first sentence of Section
34-60 deals with all implied tenancies and transmutes all implied tenancies into tenancies by sufferance, the remainder of
Section 34-60 and the entirety of Section 34-61 deal only with
implied tenancies which arise in holdover situations following
the expiration of an express lease. Legislative intent can, of
course, be questioned here. If the first sentence of Section
34-60 is a statement of controlling intent, then the Wyoming
statute may create an unduly harsh outcome. Perhaps the best
example of this harshness is the situation of an express oral
lease agreement with rent reservations of one year but with
express duration greater than one year. In common law jurisdictions a court could preserve the obvious intent of the parties
by finding an implied periodic tenancy instead of a tenancy
at will, under which both parties' right to proper notice is preserved and the landlord's right to the agreed upon rent is
retained. 45 In Wyoming, if the first sentence of Section 34-60
controls, both parties lose the protection of proper notice due
43. See Note, Creation and Termination of Periodic Tenancies, 15

BAYLOR

L.

REV. 329.

44. A. H. Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930).
45. TIFFANY, REAT PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 267.
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to the creation of a tenancy by sufferance; the landlord can
maintain action only for the fair value of the lease property
during the tenant's occupation. This value is in no way reflective of the intent or agreement of the parties.
If the first sentence of Section 34-60 is not an expression
of intent but merely a preparatory statement, then the second
sentence controls as legislative intent. This means that Section
34-60 was intended to deal only with holdover situations arising upon the expiration of express leases. There is more than
nominal support for this interpretation.
The rules for statutory construction as applied in Wyoming indicate that statutes in pari materia are to be construed
together 4 6 and in harmony as far as possible.4 7 Wyoming Statutes, Section 34-61 (1957) is in pari materia with Section 3460. Section 34-61, like the bulk of Section 34-60, deals with
circumstances involved in the holdover tenant situation. If
the definition of the condition of a holdover tenant in Wyoming is the overriding purpose of Section 34-60 as it clearly
is with Section 34-61 and if by reading these two statutes in
conjunction one can more readily infer this intent, then the
contention, that sentence one of Section 34-60 is merely preparatory, gains support.
This possibility obtains validity when we note that all of
the Wyoming cases that construe Section 34-60 deal with
holdover tenant situations. McNamara v. O'Brien,48 decided
in 1881, defendant McNamara (plaintiff in error) had a written lease for a term of one year for March 5, 1876, to March
5, 1877. Under this agreement rent was payable on a monthly
basis. After the expiration of the lease on March 5, 1877, defendant held over and continued to pay rent. On March 5,
1878, defendant vacated the premises without prior notice.
Plaintiff sought rent for the period from March 5, 1878 to
April 5, 1878, on the grounds that defendant had held the
premises under an implied periodic tenancy and, as a periodic
tenant, had failed to give proper notice. The court construed
Section 34-60 to mean that defendant holding over after the
46.

Stringer v. Board of County Com'rs of Big Horn County, 347 P.2d 197 (Wyo.
1959).
47. Gale v. School Dist. No. 4, 49 Wyo. 384, 54 P.2d 811 (1936).
48. McNamara v. O'Brien, 2 Wyo. 447 (1881).
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expiration of an express lease, without a written renewal of
the lease and absent an express new lease, was only a tenant
by sufferance. As such the tenant retained mere naked possession by permission of the landlord without right, and defendant was entitled to no notice of termination. McNamara,
therefore owed O'Brien no notice, and consequently owed no
rent for the period claimed.
In 1904 the court in Frank v. Stratford-Handcock9 affirmed the McNamara v. O'Brien" construction by holding
that mere possession does not impart new vitality to an expired lease, and, absent any other evidence, only a tenancy by
sufferance is created. In this situation, plaintiff StratfordHandcock took possession of land under a six-month lease
agreement containing a purchase option if certain conditions
precedent were met. Plaintiff failed to perform the conditions
but tendered the purchase price anyway. When defendant
refused to accept the tender, plaintiff retained possession of
the land under claim of right following expiration of the
lease and sued for specific performance. The courts construction of Section 34-60 resulted from its denial of plaintiff's
contention that a new or renewed lease existed.
Lawer v. Mitts,5 1 decided in 1925, involved a landlordplaintiff Lawer who sought damages in the form of reasonable
use value against defendant Mitts for the loss of use of premises. Such premises had been occupied and closed by the
sheriff because defendant had been illegally selling alcoholic
beverages. Defendant's actions had ocurred both while he was
a tenant under lease and while he was a holdover tenant following the expiration of the lease. The premises were closed
while defendant was a holdover. In deciding for plaintiff,
the court reaffirmed its earlier position concluding that a holdover tenant was only a tenant by sufferance. In this case the
court expanded its previous construction of Section 34-60 by
noting that nothing in the statute precluded a tenant's liability for the reasonable value of the use of the premises during the holdover term. The court also concluded that Section
34-60 prevented the landlord from exercising his common law
49. Frank v. Stratford-Handcock, 13 Wyo. 37, 77 P. 134 (1904).
50. McNamara v. O'Brien, supra note 48.
51. Lawer v. Mitts, supra note 14.
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option to treat the holdover tenant as either a trespasser or
periodic tenant. Thus by 1925 a trend toward strict construction of Section 34-60, as applicable to holdover tenants, had
developed.
In 1930 the Wyoming Supreme Court once again followed
the McNamara v. O'Brien2 construction of Section 34-60.
Hitshew v. Rosson" involved an action in forcible entry and
detainer brought by plaintiff llitshew to recover possession
of certain premises from defendant Rosson. Defendant had
retained the premises following the expiration of a written
lease, and the facts indicate that no new lease existed therefor
defendant was a holdover tenant. Though no notice is required
either at common law or under Section 34-60, defendant had
repeatedly refused to vacate the premises when served notice
to do so. The court found that defendant was a tenant by sufferance under Section 34-60 and entered judgment for plaintiff.
Welch v. Rice,54 a 1945 case, involved a suit for wrongful
eviction brought by plaintiff-tenants against defendant-landlords. Plaintiffs were school teachers who had occupied defendant's basement apartment for one year under an oral
lease agreement. At the commencement of the second year
plaintiffs were notified that the rent would be increased. At
this time plaintiffs commenced a search for another apartment
while retaining an oral agreement with defendants that,
should other housing be unavailable, plaintiffs could remain
for the higher rent payment. The court found that under Section 34-60 the tenants became tenants by sufferance when
notified of the rent increase since such notice terminated the
previous oral lease and since plaintiffs failed to accept the
new lease. As tenants by sufferance they were entitled to no
notice but were actually given five days' notice. Plaintiffs'
failure to vacate on time made them trespassers and as such
they were not entitled to damages for wrongful eviction.
The most recent case construing Section 34-60 was decided
in 1949. In Vissenberg v. Breshnahei "5 the court dealt with
52.
53.
54.
55.

McNamara v. O'Brien, supra note 48.
Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo. 509, 287 P. 316 (1930).
Welch v. Rice, 61 Wyo. 511, 159 P.2d 502 (1945).
Vissenberg v. Breshnahen, 65 Wyo. 367, 202 P.2d 663 (1949).
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a tenant (plaintiff) who held over after the expiration of his
written lease. Defendant-landlord gave notice to vacate and
subsequently obtained a judgment in a suit for forcible entry
and detainer. When tenant still refused to vacate, defendant
peaceably entered. Plaintiff-tenant seeks recovery for damages and conversion. The court found that plaintiff was a
tenant by sufferance by operation of Section 34-60 and of
Section 34-61. As such the court held that plaintiff could
not recover for defendant's peaceable entry.
Apparently Wyoming is committed to the rule that by
operation of law, a holdover tenant can only be considered to
be a tenant by sufferance. Since nothing in the cases previously discussed aids us in determining which sentence in Section
34-60 controls as an indicator of intent, we must now turn to
a consideration of Day v. Smith."e
Day v. Smith" poses an interesting problem for consideration. At first reading this case seems to be precedent for the
conclusion that tenancies, other than those by sufferance,
may exist by implication in Wyoming. Should other implied
tenancies exist in Wyoming, then one can more convincingly
argue that Section 34-60 applies only to holdover tenants.
Day v. Smith" involves an express oral lease of indefinite
duration with rent reserved on a day to day basis. Since the
lease was express, Section 34-60 was not a matter for the court
to construe and the statute was not mentioned in the case. The
question before the court concerns the propriety of the landlord's re-entry. Briefly stated, the facts are these. Plaintiff
Day entered into the oral lease agreement as a tenant of defendant Smith. On or about May 15, 1928, plaintiff became insane
and left the premises. At this time he was committed to the
state insane asylum. At some uncertain date thereafter defendant entered on and took possession of the leasehold. The
facts indicate that no notice of termination of the lease was
given by either party. The court held that mere non-payment
of rent conferred no right of re-entry without notice upon
defendant.5" Of the several issues raised, the ones concerning
56.
57.
58.
59.

Day v. Smith, 46 Wyo. 515, 30 P.2d 786 (1934).
Id.
Id.
Id., at 788.
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us here are, (1) the type of tenancy involved and, (2) the notice required under that type of tenancy.
In determining the type of tenancy present, the court
proceeded to confuse the issue of tenancies by implication in
Wyoming. The tenancy in question was one for undetermined
duration with rent reserved on a day by day basis. By definition this might be considered to be a special form of tenancy at
will.6" Had the court accepted this definition, it could have
ruled that no notice was required for termination of a tenancy
at will." The validity of the landlord's re-entry would have
been established without any hint of the possible existence of
tenancies by implication in Wyoming contrary to Section
34-60.
The court, however, saw no actual tenancy at will. They
perceived that a lease for an indefinite time must depend on
the intervals of rent payment for its actual term duration.
This meant that the lease in question had to be viewed as a
tenancy from day to day, i.e., a periodic tenancy, either implied or express. This produced a logical roadblock for the
court for a periodic tenancy cannot be implied due to Section
34-60, and whether the periodic tenancy is express or implied,
it requires notice for termination.6 2 The facts were unclear
as to the presence or absence of notice. The court would have
had to conclude that, absent proof of notice, the landlorddefendant was unlawfully on the premises after re-entry. To
do so would be to hold against the defendant on the re-entry
issue; the court was apparently unwilling to do this since it
then launched into an attempt to show that no notice was
needed in the case of a tenancy from day to day. This the court
accomplished by relating the significance of a day to day
tenancy to that of a tenancy at will. The court concluded that
tenancies from period to period arose out of tenancies at will.6"
Next the court concluded that tenancies from day to day were
not worth much more than tenancies at will so such periodic
tenancies for extremely short terms could be treated as tenanSpirit-wood Grain Co. v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 29.
Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. Flaccomio, supra note 30.
61. Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, supra note 35.
62. Day v. Smith, supra note 56, at 788.
63. Day v. Smith, supra note 56, at 789.

60.
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cies at will." Now the court said that notice to quit was not
required of tenancies at will so logically it could not be required of tenancies from day to day which were like tenancies
at will."5 Therefore, the landlord's re-entry without apparent
or proven notice was justified. To strengthen its position and
admittedly to cover its logic if wrong, the court proceeded to
say that the equities of the situation justified the landlord's
action anyway."8
At this point the court turned to consideration of other
issues unimportant to us here. We are still left wondering if
the court actually found an implied periodic tenancy. The
answer is no. The lease from the beginning created a tenancy
at will. For all its logical rambling through the wonderland
of periodic tenancies from day to day, the court ultimately
found a tenancy that was so like a tenancy at will that they
must be treated similarily. To conclude that Day v. Smith 7
establishes precedent for the implication of tenancies other
than those provided for by Section 34-60 would be to further
agitate the water already muddied.
Where then do we stand in our attempt to construe Section 34-60 ? We have determined that the only cases applying
68
this statute deal with holdover tenants. Day v. Smith provides no useable precedent to the contrary.
CONCLUSION

The question of tenancy by implication is a complicated
and confused area of Wyoming law. Section 34-60 is couched
in language that precludes any tenancy by implication in Wyoming except tenancy by sufferance. By implication Section
34-60 may apply only to holdover tenant situations; judicial
application seems to uphold this notion. Day v. Smith,6 9 an
isolated 1930 decision, lends no support to the contention
that periodic tenancies by implication may exist in Wyo64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Day v. Smith, supra note 56.
Id.

69. ld.
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ming. All of the preceding conclusions taken together indicate a need for statutory revision.
The first step in such a revision should be to separate
different situations by statute. The majority of tenancies by
implication arise from holdover situations. Since holdover
tenants hold without consent and are only bare licensees, they
should be afforded no such benefit as to be considered bona
fide tenants of any sort. Holdover tenants should continue
to be considered to be tenants by sufferance only. In order to
codify case law and eliminate speculation, the holdover statute
should provide that the tenant is (1) liable for reasonable occupation and use, (2) liable in ejectment or summary proceedings should he fail to vacate when ordered to do so, and (3)
is entitled to no advance notice of termination.
Another statute should preclude periodic tenancies by
implication. Implied periodic tenancies too often bastardize
the intent of the parties because not only must the presence of
a tenancy be implied but all the terms of such tenancy must
be implied as well.
A third statute should state that tenancies at will are to
be implied in all situations requiring implied tenancies except
the holdover situation. Tenants at will hold as a result of the
affirmative consent of the landlord and are in many ways similar to tenants by sufferance, except that tenants at will hold
by right. This statute would preserve the intent of the parties
to create a tenancy, but it would bind neither party should he
desire to terminate or enter into a subsequent express agreement. An implied tenancy at will, contrary to an implied
periodic tenancy, would force the implication of nothing more
than a tenancy by right.
To avoid the inequity of failing to allow rent apportionment, the tenancy at will statute should also provide that any
rent due and owing by the tenant at will is to be apportioned.
Such apportionment will be based on the number of days of
actual occupation as compared with the number of days in
the rent period. Such a provision would protect the tenant
from being compelled to pay rent for a whole period should he
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/7
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vacate in the middle of a rent period. Such a provision would
also allow the landlord to collect rent for the length of use of
the property should he elect to terminate the tenancy in the
middle of a period.
DAVID BERRY
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